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ABSTRACT 
How do Press Freedom & Democracy Impact Controlling Corruption? A Focus on 
Corruption in Africa  
 
 
BY  
  
Samuka Ahmed Konneh 
 
This research studies the combined effects of democracy and press freedom on corruption. In the 
study, we seek to understand if democracy and freedom of the press act separately or together to 
curb corruption. Exploiting various empirical strategies, we investigated to explain it takes the 
joint impacts of democracy and freedom of the media to reduce the incidence of graft. The work 
goes deeper to seek to understand the causes and consequences of corruption in Africa and offers 
policy recommendations in line with the investigation. Using a 17-year panel data and exploiting 
numerous empirical methodologies, the research shows it takes a combination of a nation having 
democratic institutions that allow journalists to operate freely without political and monetary 
pressures to have effects on controlling corruption. While corruption on the continent is an African 
problem, due to its international dimensions and the complex involvement of foreign actors, the 
study highlights it would require effective governance and cooperative cross-national efforts to 
curtail the rampant graft in Africa.  
Keywords: Corruption, Press Freedom, Democracy, International Dimension 
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Chapter 1  
1. Introduction  
 
Researchers have sought to understand the complex correlation between freedom of the press, 
democracy, and corruption for decades (Brunetti et al. 1998; Bardhan, 1997; Mauro, 1996; Tanzi, 
1994). A considerable number of scholars and policy-makers believe an independent press acts 
significantly in curbing corruption. However, the extent to which free media performs in fighting 
graft remains controversial among significant researchers and requires further studies (Fardigh, 
Andersson & Oscarsson, 2011). Various scholars have elaborated on how democratic societies 
with a robust press, uncontrolled by the political elites (laws and regulations restricting freedom 
of speech or threats against journalists and media moguls) and monetary concerns tend to have 
lower corruption levels (Fisman and Gatti, 1999; Goel and Nelson 1998).  
Using extended data and new time frame, we will seek to understand how developing countries 
fare under this assumption. Whereas previous studies (Treisman, 2000; Paldam 2000; Brunetti & 
Weder 2003; Freille et al. 2007; and Bhattacharyya & Hodler, 2015) have examined this topic, 
exploiting the combinations of empirical strategies, i.e. (regressions with lagged variables, panel 
fixed effects, sub-groups and regional analyses) this research will attempt to demonstrate the 
relationships between press freedom, democracy and corruption need further work.  
 It is often observed; political operatives and politicians tend to appropriate illicit funds through 
their connections to power. According to Treisman (2000), democratization serves as a powerful 
tool to curtail political corruption (Bhattacharyya & Hodler, 2015). Free & fair elections can give 
citizens the opportunity to hold corrupt elected-officials to account. In an empirical work about 
electoral accountability and corruption in Brazil, Ferraz & Finan (2011) show the release of the 
country’s anti-corruption reports indicates a significant effect on how incumbent mayors perform 
2 
 
in municipal elections. The authors show that in regions with a robust institutional mechanism and 
a freer press, first-term mayors with reelection incentives exhibited less corruption than two-term 
ones who face term limits (Ferraz & Finan, 2011). Their findings suggest when there are 
functioning systems and citizens can freely express their wills at the polls without fear or 
intimidations and with a robust press reporting on bad behaviors, democratic elections can lower 
corruption. Brunetti and Weder (2003) state, as unlawful acts occur covertly, a free, independent 
media can serve as a powerful instrument to uncover fraud. 
Transparency International [TI] (2018) states, influential persons and politicians abusing their 
power for private gains constitute corruption.  Depending on the amounts of stolen public funds 
and the affected sector, one could classify corruption as grand, petty and political. TI elaborates 
high-level crimes and policy distortions that affect the proper functioning of the state can be 
classified as a large-cased graft. Daily abuses and extortionary behaviors by junior and mid-level 
officials in their dealings with citizens seeking public services in government bureaus, schools and 
hospitals constitute minor corruption; while manipulative procedures and policies that bend the 
rules of the game in resource allocation are examples of political corruption (TI, 2018). 
 In this study, we seek to understand if democracy and freedom of the press act separately or 
together to curb corruption. Exploiting various empirical strategies, we investigated to explain it 
takes the combined effects of democracy and press freedom in a nation to reduce the incidence of 
corruption. The findings highlight nations with strong democratic norms that allow journalists to 
operate freely without political and monetary pressures tend do well in controlling corruption.   
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1.1. Aims and Significance 
 
Scholars have shown that Sub-Saharan African countries appear to be some of the world’s most 
corrupt nations. As high-level of corruption seems to have a detrimental impact on government 
effectiveness, donor partners, African governments and international organizations seem to focus 
on finding solutions to corrupt practices that have had severe consequences on citizens’ lives on 
the continent. This research seeks to examine how the joint effects of democracy and press freedom 
can lower corruption. Exploiting various regression analyses, the study will show these variables 
can have impacts on reducing graft.  
 While corruption on the continent remains an African problem, considering the vast numbers of 
foreign firms involved in illicit cross-border transfers and the international dimension of the 
phenomenon, in this paper, we will illustrate that it would require effective governance, 
collaboration among member states and their international partners to combat corruption. Using 
findings based on data from Escresa and Picci (2017) and research by the United Nations 
Economic Council for Africa on alternative ways of measuring corruption in Africa, we will 
examine this international dimension of graft in Sub-Saharan nations.  
1.2. Research Questions 
  
In this study, I will attempt to answer the following questions:  
• Do increases in the levels of democracy and press freedom affect controlling corruption?  
• Do these determinants (democratization and freedom of the press) act separately or jointly 
in lowering corruption? 
• How do developing nations in sub-Saharan Africa fare under these assumptions?  
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• What are issues in measuring corruption that are attributed to Africa’s high perception of 
corruption? 
• How does the international dimension of corruption affect lowering graft on the continent?  
1.3. The Theoretical Relationships between Democracy, Press Freedom & Corruption 
 
One of the earliest theories of corruption is Susan Rose-Ackerman’s Principal-agent model. It 
states there is a divergence in interests between the principal, the elected official, and low-level 
bureaucrat, or the agent and that there is an informational asymmetry to the agent ’s advantage, 
but that the principal can prescribe the pay-off rules in their relationship (Groenendijk, 1997). In 
this framework, the incidences of corruption, i.e., firms bribing bureaucrats to gain leverages in a 
government’s contracting or bidding procedures were the initial focuses of the model. In her later 
analysis, she extends the model to high-level political and low-level bureaucratic corruption. 
Under these assumptions, she argues that elected officials in democracies based on strong legal 
foundations must feel insecure and worried about their reelection potentials. The longer and the 
more politicians feel secured about their tenures, the higher the likelihood they will engage in 
corrupt arrangements. Groenendijk (1997) explains that Liu, Klitgaard, and Alam extended the 
principal-agent models. The author states that Alam argues the variations in cross-societal and 
agency corruption depend on the victim's ability to engage in countervailing actions. When citizens 
are well-educated and informed, and they can take measures to hold their elected leaders 
accountable, thus, increasing the likelihoods of checks on the incidence of corruption, this can 
eventually lead to a reduction in unethical behaviors. When citizens in Korea insisted on the 
weekend candlelight protests, this led the National Assembly to impeach President Park Geun-
Hye for a political scandal in December 2016. Scholars (Lawson 2009; Rose-Ackerman 1978; 
Teorell 2007) who argue for this mechanism, state fighting corruption should seek to increase the 
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agent’s cost of corrupt acts. As such, they have elaborated on the need for more openness, good 
regulatory institutions for checks and balances, a free press, independent corruption commissions, 
better pay for public servants and so on. 
Another famous theory that explains corruption is the rent-seeking model. This model evaluates 
how policymakers and lobbyists seek various preferential treatments in the decision-making 
process. Competitive lobbying and corruption are considered under this approach (Lambsdorff, 
2002). In resource allocation, according to this model, lobbyists may seek to redirect public policy 
to their clients’ advantage. Rent-seeking may differ from corruption as it may not involve illegal 
payments to politicians, but it may affect systems in a manner that may not be in the public interest 
(Zucoloto, Nogueira, & Pereira, 2018).   
In these scenarios, under functioning democracies based on the rule of law, an independent media 
can serve as a watchdog to monitor power and provide citizens with the information to hold 
governments accountable for their actions (Adserà, Boix, & Payne, 2011; Chowdhury, 2004; 
Strömberg, 2002).  The role of the free press is not just to inform voters of politicians and agenda 
setters’ actions, but it can also be useful in the inputs and outcomes of the policy process by 
monitoring public officials to constrain their abilities to misuse their power, which can ultimately 
improve government’s effectiveness and reduce corruption. 
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Chapter 2 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
A considerable number of scholars have found that corruption has detrimental effects on economic 
growth; as a result, academics and most policymakers seem to believe this crime is one of the 
critical themes in growth policy (Brunetti et al. 1998; Bardhan, 1997; Mauro, 1996; Tanzi,1994). 
In this paper, we will seek to understand this assumption and prove that democratization and press 
freedom can have effects on the control of corruption. Since the 1960s, academics have been 
working to understand how corruption impacts development dividends in countries (Rose-
Ackerman, 1975).  Using cross-countries analyses, scholars have exploited various econometrics 
techniques to uncover corruption true causal determinants (Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme 
1998). While policy-makers and academics have sought to find remedies for controlling graft, it 
remains challenging as corruption appears to be endemic in some developing countries.  
2.2. Press Freedom and Corruption 
 
In this section, I will provide an account on how effective a free press can serve as controls on 
bureaucratic corruption. According to Bolsius (2012), most definitions of corruption has three key 
components. The emphasis is on the public role an official fulfills when he conducts his abusive 
behavior; secondly, the personal gain an official seeks; and lastly, an official’s behavior can only 
be corrupt when the behavior “deviates from normal duties” (p. 12). This requirement separates 
corruption from other, but related kinds of misbehaviors that are conducted by private 
organizations, such as business corruption and fraud, (Gardiner, 2002, p. 28). Public interest or 
misusing the masses' funds for self-gains by officials is critical in labeling corrupt acts. However, 
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this categorization is disputed by some in the literature. A public official might act in ways in his 
private life that can infringe on the public interest. 
Corruption, according to Klitgaard (1988) and De Soto (1989), is a significant obstacle to 
economic development in low-income countries. Various economists through a series of empirical 
work tend to prove this assumption. In a cross-countries study, Mauro (1995) found that corruption 
can have opposite effects on investment. Research by Brunetti et al. (2005) and M Knack and 
Keefer (1995) illustrate weak institutions could lower economic development through an illegal 
accumulation of wealth and inefficient resource allocations. An analysis of TI recent data shows, 
states with the worst CPI scores tend to have lower development outcomes, which supports 
previous findings. Fardigh, Andersson, Oscarsson (2011) iilustrate three types of determinants can 
explain the incidence of corruption. Firstly, if internal structures and bureaucratic incentives exit 
to control graft; and whether external devices/ structures as an independent judiciary or a watchdog 
are in place to check it. And that cultural norms and the appropriated rents’ amount can also explain 
corruption. Media freedom thus serves as an external check on   illicit activities 
Freille et al. (2007) argue that greater press freedom correlates with low-level corruption. Ahrend 
(2002) shows that this association cannot be attributed to spurious variables and that the direction 
of this relationship runs from press freedom to corruption (as cited in Freille et al. 2007, p.3). 
Others (for example Freille et al., 2007) believe that this relationship picks up wealth effects and 
the institutional environment more generally. Corruption can be eliminated in two ways: corrupt 
officials decide to change their criminal behaviors, or they are caught and sentenced if proven 
guilty. The press can help with both mechanisms. Aggressive media reporting in exposing bribery 
and other crimes can make it costly for public employees to engage in dubious acts.  The rationale 
for a corrupt action is the expected profit against the costs. If this cost increases so that such 
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officials can easily be subjected to public disgrace, being tried or loss of jobs, this might help in 
changing their behaviors. While the findings suggest a higher level of press freedom is correlated 
with controlling corruption, one should be mindful of this connection and that it works better with 
advanced open democracies than closed societies. 
2.3. Democracy and Corruption 
 
The literature shows various scholars have studied different determinants of corruption (Treisman, 
2000; Paldam 2000; Brunetti & Weder 2003; Freille et al. 2007; and Bhattacharyya & Hodler, 
2015). In this paper, we intend to add to the discussion focusing on how the increase in 
democratization and the freedom of the press can affect corruption control and how the variables 
can explain remedies to Africa’s corruption problem. Exploiting cross-country analyses, scholars 
have found democracy and media press can lower crime. Using a 17-year panel data of 130 
countries, Adserà et al. (2003) state the effectiveness of governments to meet the needs of their 
citizens depends on how good people are in holding politicians accountable for their actions. They 
elaborate that two factors (free and regular elections & the degree of citizen information) determine 
the political control of public officials. The threat of losing reelection allows citizens to discipline 
politicians and compels public officials to cater to citizens’ demands. And that frequent reporting 
and circulation of newspapers reduce opportunities for politicians to engage in dubious acts 
(Adserà, Boix, & Payne, 2011).  The extent to how effective these concepts can aid to hold 
politicians accountable depend a lot on voters’ sophistication. In low developed countries, political 
candidates tend to engage in vote buying. As the masses may not receive the right information or 
understand political issues well, they tend to vote for the wrong candidates. However, even in such 
settings, with regular free and fair elections under a sound democratic system, citizens could oust 
corrupt incumbent politicians.  
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Chowdhury elaborates a free press shares lights on political corruption, thereby empowering voters 
to punish corrupt politicians by ousting them through elections in a democracy. In functional 
democracies, elected officials react to voters by reducing corruption (Chowdhury, 2004). 
Corruption, according to (Heymann, 1996), is not just a problem of public officials. Private agents 
offering rents to effect decisions of general interest for their gains contribute a lot to the problem.   
Researchers and policymakers tend to agree that good governance can lead to significant 
development outcomes. Various scholars agree there is a long-term causal effect of institutional 
quality on development. Daniel Kaufman and the World Bank (2005) suggest a standard-deviation 
rise in effective governance raises income in the long run by some two-to threefold which could 
generate large development dividends in countries. The authors report that nations with better 
institutional quality tend to grow faster even over a short-term (10 years) period. (KALFMANN 
& Bank, 2005).Considering the causal impact of proper public administration on economic 
development, aid effectiveness, and other development dividends, poor governance in Africa has 
been the concerns of many in the donor world in the past decades (“Private Sector Development 
in West Africa,” 2014). While some have argued that such poor management on the continent is 
due to the acute poverty, the authors stress there is little empirical evidence to support such a claim. 
Considering development outcomes in other regions, it is good governance, i.e., improving the 
rule of law, quality of institutions (more openness and democracy) controlling corruption that can 
lead to higher development dividends.  
A lot of the previous corruption research tend to focus mostly on the perception-based views and 
sometimes underplay the contextual complexities of African nations. Cross-country perception-
based analyses may be misleading as countries differ a lot on their historical, cultural and political 
realities and may affect how respondents perceived states. While perception-based indexes remain 
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useful as they offer viable data for empirical research, they tend to suffer from sample selection 
problems and may provide limited insights for policy recommendations, especially in the case of 
African countries. Whereas previous studies (Treisman, 2000; Paldam 2000; Brunetti & Weder 
2003; Freille et al. 2007; and Bhattacharyya & Hodler, 2015) have examined this topic, exploiting 
the combinations of empirical strategies, i.e. (regressions with lagged variables, panel fixed effects, 
sub-groups and regional analyses) this research will attempt to demonstrate the relationships 
between press freedom, democracy and corruption need further work.   
2.4. Corruption Trends in Africa 
 
While there are some encouraging gains on the war on corruption in some African countries, 
various estimates show the world’s most corrupt nations lay in this region. Academics and policy-
makers believe graft leads to lower economic growth and poverty on the continent. A report by 
the African Union in 2002 indicates the estimated cost of corruption in Africa is roughly $150 
billion a year, far more than 22.5 billion the OECD calculates the continent receives in 
development aid in 2008.  According to the Global Justice Now (as cited in the Guardian, 2017, 
p.2), “More wealth leaves Africa every year than enters it – by more than $40bn (£31bn)”.  Their 
findings indicate in 2015 Sub-Saharan nations received $162bn through loans, aid and personal 
remittances; while either through multinational firms, corrupt cash flights or climate change 
adaptation and mitigation costs, $203 billion was wired out of the continent. The publication 
quoted Honest Accounts (2017) that such huge illegal transfers lead to the yearly financial loss of 
$41.3bn from 47 African countries. The paper further elaborates that “The campaigners said illicit 
financial flows, defined as the illegal movement of cash between countries, account for $68bn a 
year, three times as much as the $19bn Africa receives in aid” (Guardian, 2017, p.1).  
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As the population in most African nations is predominately young, with over two thirds below 35, 
a 2017 UNDP report states the youth in Africa will bear the brunt of such illicit cash outflow. The 
continent, as per the finding, loses some $30bn to $60bn annually due to cross-border transfers 
(UNDP, 2017).  This report and other findings show how shunted development on the continent 
can lead to acute impoverishment, rampant curable diseases and loss of hope for all age groups. 
The opportunity cost of graft on the on young Africans appears exceptionally high. As such, they 
tend to take on risky journeys for greener pastures, which leads to a brain drain and lower economic 
growth on the continent. Corrupt practices can act as a tax on innovation which can retard young 
people innovation potentials.  The distortionary effects of corruption on the talent pool can work 
on the incentive structure of a country.  
Transparency International recent findings indicate a hopeful cleaner picture for the continent. 
With well-managed sustained measures, CPI points to gains in Rwanda and Cape Verde. Cote 
D’Ivoire and Senegal are showing promising signs. However, South Sudan and Somalia still lay 
at the bottom of the index and the continent is always the worst performing region (Transparency 
International [TI], 2018).  
According to TI (2018),  the CPIs of Botswana and Seychelles (61 & 60) respectively, are better 
than Spain at 57.  This development reinforces expert opinions on fighting corruption, as stated by 
the anti-graft body; with good leadership, well-sustained efforts and political will, nations can win 
the war on corruption.The report elaborates Rwanda’s President, Paul Kagame, make specific strict 
compliance with the leadership code in the country; Cabo Verde ‘s Jorge Fonseca promotes 
institutional transparency, and President Ian Khama maintains a creative approach to mainstream 
anti-corruption strategies in Botswana's ministries (TI, 2018). These well-performing African 
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nations have learned measures that work well in their settings and have pursued these tactics with 
commitments. 
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Chapter 3  
3. The Empirical Model 
 
The main estimations are based on a cross-section of 140 countries considering period averages 
from 2000 to 2017  
The link between democracy and press freedom on corruption can be summarized using the 
following regression equation: 
corruptioni = α + β1demoi + β2pressi + β3(demoi ∗ pressi) + δXi + εi                             (1) 
corruptioni indicates the perception of corruption in country i measured by CPI, demoi measures 
the level of democracy in country i,  pressi  checks the freedom of press in country i,  Xi is a set 
of covariates, the log of GDP per capita (lnGDP), political stability (PolStab) and a dummy if a 
nation is  former British colony,( BritCol)). 𝛿 is a vector of coefficient estimates of the control 
variables and 𝜀𝑖 is an idiosyncratic error term.  Our primary coefficients of interest are β3…… 
which captures the impact of democracy and press freedom on corruption.  
𝜕𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖
𝜕𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑂𝑖
= 𝑋1 + 𝑋3 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖                                                                                          (  2) 
The model depends on the marginal impact of the key variables, which implies the effect of 
democracy on corruption would depend on the level of press freedom in a country. I.e. the higher 
the level of press freedom in a democratic country, the greater the likelihood of reduction in the 
incidence of corruption. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Note: This table shows the summary statistics, and it indicates variables used this research. Some of the data have been 
normalized to make easier reading of the regression results.  The information below overs details on the variables. 
The literature review reveals academics tend to use Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) as a measure of corruption. We also use the World Bank’s World 
Governance Indicator’s (WGI index) Control of Corruption Estimates as an alternative dependent 
variable. The current CPI index ranges from 0 (too much corruption) to 100 (total lack of). 
However, some time frames in the data begin from 0 (worst corruption) to 10 (total absence of).  
To make reading our regression estimates easier we use the index as in the range 0 and 10 for our 
panel. Our panel data ranges from 2000 to 2017. CPI is based on the views and opinions of business 
people and citizens about the perception of corruption in the country. The control of corruption 
estimates ranges between -2.5 (very corrupt) to 2.5 (least corrupt) and fall falls part of the World 
Governance Indicator. According to the World Bank (2018), it estimates the limit public power is 
abused for private gain. It checks the extent of elite capture, grand and low-level forms of 
corruption.  The CPI scores of the recent least corrupt countries include: New Zealand, 89; 
Denmark, 88; Finland, 85; and Norway 85; while the worst ones are: Yemen, 16; Afghanistan, 15; 
Syria, 16; South Sudan, 12; and Somalia 9 (Transparency International, 2018).   
 
  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Maximum Minimum 
Democracy (0 = absence of democracy; 10 = 
highest level of democracy) 2,550 6.373 3.118 10 0 
WB Control of Corruption Estimate (-2.5 = 
highest corruption; 2.5 = absence of 
corruption) 2,261 -0.0895 1.031 2.469 -1.813 
Former British Colonies (A dummy variable = 
0 or 1) 2,484 0.297 0.457 1 0 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence 
(Partial index of world government indicators) 2,270 -0.039 1.002 2.436 -2.231 
Log of GDP in 2011 (GDP Per Capita) 2,455 9.052 1.294 11.77 6.302 
Corruption Perception Index (0 = highest 
corruption; 10 = absence of corruption) 2,111 4.224 2.162 10 0.4 
Freedom of the Press Index (0 = worst; 10 = 
highest press freedom) 2,255 5.042 2.388 9.2 0.1 
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Figure 1: Transparency International 2017 Pictorial CPI of the World 
 
                                        Source: Transparency International  
Note: Pictorial representation of Transparency International 2017 World’s CPI. Deep to lighter red colors signify highest to very 
corrupt nations, while deep to brighter yellow indicates moderate to less corrupt states on the scale of (0=highly corrupt & 100= 
less corrupt) 
Freedom House’s Press Freedom Index (Press) is our key independent variable. According to 
Freedom House (2018), a total country score ranges between 0 (best) to 100 (worst) based on 23 
methodology questions and 109 indicators divided into three (legal, political, and economic 
environment) weighted subcategories by Freedom House’s researchers.  Countries are grouped 
into three categories: scores ranging from (0-30) is considered free, (31-60) partly free, (61-100) 
not free. We normalize and standardized this index by subtracting 100 from a country press 
freedom score and dividing it by 10 to make easier interpreting the coefficients. The latest (2017) 
index scored 199 countries and territories. 61, 72 & 66 states were rated Free (31%), Partly Free 
(36%) and Not Free (33%) respectively. The report indicates Azerbaijan, Crimea, Cuba, Equatorial 
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Guinea, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Syria, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan were the world’s ten 
worst-rated countries and territories. And that freedom of the press around the world declined to 
its lowest point in 13 years in 2016 due to threats against media persons in major democracies and 
new steps by autocratic states to control the press, including beyond their borders (Freedom House, 
2018). 
Democracy: Our main index of democracy is the (Freedom House-Polity2) level of democracy. It 
ranges between zero (least democratic) to ten (most democratic) countries. It is the average of 
Freedom House political rights and civil liberties which are transformed into a score 0-10 and 
Polity2IV transformed to a scale 0-10. The two scales are averaged into fh_polity2. For 
endogeneity concern, some researchers have opted to use the Vanhanen’s democratization index.  
According to them, this index does not factor in press freedom as an aspect of democracy as in 
other measures of democracy. We had tried to use this measure, but the version of the data we 
downloaded have a lot of missing values in the years and our observations of interest. While our 
measure of democracy might contain some elements that are included in measuring freedom of the 
press, according to the University of Gothenburg’s Quality of Government database (2018) this 
(Level of Democracy (Freedom House/Imputed Polity) has imputed values for nations where data 
on polity is missing. According to the authors, by running polity on the mean of Freedom House 
estimates, this version tends to be valid and reliable than its constituents’ parts or the polity2IV 
that is commonly used as a measure of democracy (Teorell, Dahlberg, Holmberg, Rothstein, & 
Natalia Svensson, 2018).  
Our key control variables include Political Stability: A World Bank’s governance indicator that 
measures the perception of the political stability and violence’s likelihood. Log of GDP per capita: 
measures the level of economic growth in a country.   BritCol, a dummy variable which indicates 
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if a state is a former British colony.  Various scholars have used these as covariates in corruption 
research (Bhattacharyya & Hodler, 2015; Chowdhury, 2004; Kalenborn & Lessmann, 2013; 
Kaufmann & Bank, 2005; Treisman, 2014). 
Figure 2: Corruption and press freedom 
  
 
Note: Figure 2 represents the scatter plot of TI’s Corruption Perception Index on the vertical axis and Press Freedom Index on the 
horizontal axis. The interpretation of the figure follows below. 
In Figure 2, we graph the mean of two of our main variables, Corruption and Press Freedom. As 
indicated earlier, Western European countries, Norway, Sweden, and New Zealand, Canada, 
Australia, etc. have good scores indicating a lower level of corruption and higher press freedom as 
represented in the upper right-hand corner. They also tend to be more democratic. Singapore and 
the United Arab Emirates are outliers with low and above medium corruption scores respectively 
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but not so great on press freedom. Botswana and Cape Verpe appear to do well among African 
countries. Countries in bottom lower-left angle, North Korea, Myanmar, Somalia, and 
Afghanistan, etc. fare poorly on the indicators. They also seem to have poor democracy indicators.  
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Chapter 4  
4. Findings 
  
Starting with table 2 we report regressions with lagged endogenous variables. To control for 
endogeneity, following Kalenborn & Lessmann (2013), we estimate a series of regressions on the 
lagged values of our main explanatory variables. We constructed the lagged values of democracy 
and freedom of the press and formed their various interaction terms to regress on the two separate 
measures of the corruption, unlike the authors who used Transparency International’s CPI as the 
only dependent variables. In columns (1) we run the model on the lagged value of press variable, 
democracy, an interaction term between democracy and the lagged press controlling for the log of 
GDP per capita (lnGDP), political stability (PolStab), and an indicator if a country is a former 
British colonial (BritCol). In column (2) we alternate with the lagged value of democracy, an 
interaction term between lagged democracy and the press variable with controls.  In column (3) 
we include the lagged values of two explanatory variables and other controls.  
We repeat the estimations with the World Bank Control of Corruption Estimate as the dependent 
variables. In all models, the interaction terms show positive and significant estimates which are in 
line with the theory of the joint effect of democracy and press freedom on corruption as other 
scholars have found (Treisman, 2000; Chowdhury, 2004; Kalenborn & Lessmann, 2013).  
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Table 2: Regression results with lagged dependent variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES (lag Press) 
(lag 
Demo) (lag both) (lag Press) 
(lag 
Demo) (lag both) 
              
L.Press 0.0150  -0.0751 0.0299  -0.00686 
 (0.0659)  (0.0676) (0.0352)  (0.0374) 
Demo 0.0197   0.0245   
 (0.0417)   (0.0217)   
Demo*L.Press 0.0161*   0.00678   
 (0.00903)   (0.00481)   
L.Demo  0.109** 0.0909*  0.0546** 0.0495** 
  (0.0485) (0.0482)  (0.0248) (0.0245) 
Press  -0.0631   0.0114  
  (0.0582)   (0.0325)  
L.demo*Press  0.0144   0.00568  
  (0.00896)   (0.00492)  
L.Press*L.Demo   0.0170*   0.00751 
lnGDP 0.255*** 0.281*** 0.274*** 0.0666*** 0.0784*** 0.0729*** 
 (0.0362) (0.0364) (0.0369) (0.0195) (0.0202) (0.0201) 
PolStab 0.420*** 0.375*** 0.398*** 0.262*** 0.254*** 0.257*** 
 (0.0429) (0.0417) (0.0421) (0.0208) (0.0215) (0.0206) 
BritCol 0.0199 0.00321 -0.00715 0.0712** 0.0547* 0.0632** 
 (0.0566) (0.0560) (0.0559) (0.0301) (0.0309) (0.0300) 
   (0.00940)   (0.00506) 
Constant 0.690 0.368 0.527 -1.453*** -1.595*** -1.496*** 
 (0.441) (0.433) (0.458) (0.238) (0.246) (0.254) 
       
Observations 594 574 594 684 641 684 
R-squared 0.512 0.528 0.528 0.525 0.531 0.532 
Note: CPI index and Control of Corruption are the dependent variables; robust standard error are reported in parenthesis; the 
lagged independent variables are calculated by taking the lags of the variables; ***,**,and * show the significance at 1%, 5% 
& 10%". L.Press is the lag of the Press freedom, Demo*L.Press,  an interaction term between democracy and L.Press Variable. 
L.Demo, indicates the lag of Democracy variable. L.Press*L.Demo, refers to an interaction term between the two lagged 
variables. PolStab, BritCol and lnGDP are control variables are described.    
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We run a series of regressions for the robustness checks using our two measures of perception of 
corruption.  The findings are reported on Table 3. We first run robustness check using 
Transparency International’s CPI as the dependent variable. In column (1), we run a pooled OLS 
including all our key variables and the controls. And in column (2), we regress the same variables 
but with panel fixed effects. We repeat these methods with our alternate dependent variable, World 
Bank’s Control of corruption estimate, in and columns (3) and (14). As in the previous regressions, 
the coefficients on the interaction terms between democracy and press freedom remain positive 
and significant. We find that the results are comparable and robust to different specifications. This 
evidence supports complementarity between democratization and press freedom in the fight 
against corruption.  
corruptionit = αi + θt + β1demoit + β2pressit + β3(demoit ∗ pressit) + δXit + εit      (3)   
Where corruptionit  represents the corruption level in country i in time 𝑡, β3(demoit ∗
pressit), captures the combined effects of democracy and  the press freedom in country i ,  
𝑋′𝑖𝑡 is a vector of the control variables such as (the log of GDP per capita (lnGDP), political 
stability (PolStab) and a dummy if a country is former British colony, (BritCol)).  𝛼𝑖  represents 
country fixed effects, and 𝜃𝑡  year fixed effects. The standard error is clustered at the country level 
to take account of serial correlation. 
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Table 3: Robustness checks 
 Transparency International CPI WB Control of Corruption Estimate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ( Pooled-OLS) (Fixed-Effect) ( Pooled-OLS) (Fixed-Effect) 
          
Press -0.000109 0.0484 0.0525 0.0547** 
 (0.157) (0.0527) (0.0763) (0.0225) 
Demo -0.263*** -0.284*** -0.0909** -0.103*** 
 (0.0887) (0.0267) (0.0426) (0.0120) 
Demo*Press 0.0553*** 0.0498*** 0.0202** 0.0194*** 
 (0.0204) (0.00571) (0.00940) (0.00247) 
lnGDP 0.537*** 0.178** 0.248*** 0.0485 
 (0.0870) (0.0696) (0.0427) (0.0299) 
PolStab 0.540*** 0.563*** 0.277*** 0.299*** 
 (0.133) (0.0397) (0.0621) (0.0177) 
BritCol 0.481** 0.552*** 0.191** 0.233*** 
 (0.191) (0.0592) (0.0884) (0.0265) 
Constant -1.429 -0.613 -2.826*** -1.916*** 
 (0.976) (0.428) (0.485) (0.181) 
     
Observations 1,849 1,713 1,984 1,818 
R-squared 0.746 0.751 0.757 0.771 
Control Yes YES Yes YES 
Years FE Yes YES Yes YES 
Country FE No YES No YES 
NOTE: CPI index and Control of Corruption Estimate are the dependent variables; robust standard error are reported in parenthesis; ***,**,and * show the significance at 1%, 
5% & 10%". Press, Demo & Demo*Press are measures for press freedom, democracy and their interaction term respectively.  lnGDP, is the log of GDP in 2011, PolStab and 
BritCol are indicators on political stability and a dummy for former British colonies.   
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Our empirical strategy relies on the marginal effect of democracy on press freedom to account for 
controlling corruption. For countries with higher levels of press freedom, the marginal impact of 
democracy on corruption is positive and significant. To account for this joint effect of the 
explanatory variables, we run sub-group analyses of democratic and non-democratic countries. To 
do this, we set a cut off based on a certain level of a country’ democracy scores. The results 
indicate, democratic countries with higher level of press freedom show positive and significant 
estimates. We estimate with different dependent variables, and our results are robust to the 
inclusion of the control variables, interaction terms, year and country fixed effects. We report this 
result on Table 3. The result would imply it takes the combination of a certain level of 
democratization in a country, for a free press to have effects on lowering corruption. And that the 
two variables are conditional on each other. 
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Table 4: Subgroup Analysis (Democratic and non-Democratic Countries) 
         
  Transparency International CPI WB Control of Corruption Estimate 
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)         (6)         (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Panel A. Non-Democratic Countries                     
Press  0.219 0.213 0.160 0.00178 -0.0383 0.128 0.131 0.104 0.0958** 0.0813** 
 (0.239) (0.242) (0.148) (0.0584) (0.0675) (0.117) (0.120) (0.0945) (0.0409) (0.0385) 
lnGDP   0.366**  0.564**   0.146  0.266*** 
   (0.156)  (0.253)   (0.0984)  (0.0904) 
PolStab   0.823***  0.306**   0.389***  0.178*** 
   (0.239)  (0.132)   (0.126)  (0.0649) 
Britcol   0.863**     0.418*   
   (0.398)     (0.212)   
Constant 2.700*** 3.140*** 0.0970 3.275*** -1.422 -0.922*** -0.861*** -1.937* -0.801*** -3.023*** 
 (0.487) (0.670) (1.572) (0.213) (2.279) (0.268) (0.291) (0.969) (0.101) (0.786) 
           
Observations 411 411 369 411 369 460 460 414 460 414 
R-squared 0.020 0.032 0.617 0.960 0.953 0.029 0.035 0.534 0.965 0.968 
Panel B. Democratic Countries          
                     
Press 1.031*** 1.050*** 0.506*** 0.176** 0.112 0.500*** 0.503*** 0.249*** 0.130*** 0.129*** 
 (0.0821) (0.0835) (0.0815) (0.0737) (0.0762) (0.0372) (0.0379) (0.0376) (0.0339) (0.0319) 
lnGDP   0.657***  1.529***   0.278***  0.236*** 
   (0.123)  (0.282)   (0.0539)  (0.0754) 
PolStab   0.574***  0.0694   0.311***  0.0266 
   (0.143)  (0.107)   (0.0673)  (0.0438) 
BritCol   0.256     0.0809   
   (0.265)     (0.117)   
Constant -1.440*** -2.084*** -4.765*** 3.735*** -10.20*** -2.743*** -2.904*** -3.949*** -0.427** -2.676*** 
 (0.511) (0.551) (1.111) (0.537) (2.843) (0.241) (0.246) (0.477) (0.208) (0.776)            
Observations 868 868 807 868 807 836 836 820 836 820 
R-squared 0.684 0.697 0.800 0.971 0.976 0.727 0.729 0.829 0.983 0.983 
Control No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes 
Years FE No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No 
Country FE No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes 
Note: CPI index and Control of Corruption are the dependent variables; robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis; ***, **, and * show the significance at 1%, 5% & 10%".  Panel A shows 
the impacts of the variables on the sub-sets of non-democratic countries while Panel B reports on democratic countries.  lnGDP, is the log of GDP in 2011, PolStab and BritCol are indicators on 
political stability and a dummy for former British colonies.  
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4.1. Regressions with African Countries  
 
In most previous research on this subject, scholars tend to include a few dummies for a sample of 
African countries. As a lot of the massive corrupt nations remain on the continent, we seek to see 
how the region will fare under the estimations. Besides, including a few African countries in our 
main models as reported on the previous tables, we repeat our lagged regressions and the 
robustness checks with only African countries. We report the results on table 4.  As one can 
observe, a lot of the results are not robustly significant. However, the interaction terms remain 
positive and moderately significant in the lagged regressions in some instances while we observe 
significant estimates on the interaction terms with the results of panel fixed effects in columns (8) 
and (10).  
Scholars and policy makers have sought to understand the reasons for Africa’s high perception of 
corruptions, and they tend to offer conflicting views.  An analysis of our three key variables 
(corruption, press freedom & democracy) highlights why one would not be surprised by these 
results. In the median relative ranking of Africa and the world’s other regions with uninterrupted 
CPI scores from 2007-2014, the continent does better than South Asia; Africa’s best performers 
(Botswana & Seychelles) have medium 2017 corruption perception scores of (61 & 60) 
respectively, Cabo Verde, Rwanda, and Namibia also did well (TI, 2018). However, a significant 
number of countries with the low or bottom scores are Sub-Saharan African nations. Equatorial 
Guinea and Eritrea also fall on Freedom House’s World worst-rated countries in 2017. Several 
other countries in the region are said to have extended restricted media laws or have taken measures 
to curtail free speech. In line with our theory, it is not surprising to observe insignificant estimates  
as most of the states on the continent are early in their democratization. 
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Table 5: Robustness Checks (African countries) 
 Transparency International CPI WB Control of Corruption Estimate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ( Pooled-OLS) (Fixed-Effect) ( Pooled-OLS) (Fixed-Effect) 
          
Press -0.0641 -0.0294 0.0115 0.0166 
 (0.148) (0.0494) (0.106) (0.0279) 
Demo -0.0317 -0.0917** 0.0184 -0.0257 
 (0.0953) (0.0375) (0.0681) (0.0215) 
Demo*Press 0.0266 0.0289*** 0.00881 0.0121*** 
 (0.0201) (0.00717) (0.0150) (0.00406) 
lnGDP 0.212* -0.337*** 0.0635 -0.275*** 
 (0.111) (0.0700) (0.0745) (0.0387) 
PolStab 0.451*** 0.407*** 0.266*** 0.242*** 
 (0.105) (0.0415) (0.0641) (0.0236) 
Britcol 0.0793 0.0632 0.0654 0.0470 
 (0.159) (0.0586) (0.111) (0.0334) 
Constant 1.351 3.396*** -1.326* 0.0652 
 (1.044) (0.514) (0.780) (0.269) 
     
Observations 574 534 641 592 
R-squared 0.571 0.627 0.522 0.597 
Control Yes YES Yes YES 
Years FE Yes YES Yes YES 
Country FE No YES No YES 
NOTE: CPI index and Control of Corruption Estimate are the dependent variables; robust standard error are reported in 
parenthesis; ***,**,and * show the significance at 1%, 5% & 10%". Press, Demo & Demo*Press are measures for press freedom, 
democracy and their interaction term respectively.  lnGDP, is the log of GDP in 2011, PolStab and BritCol are indicators on 
political stability and a dummy for former British colonies.   
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4.2. Reasons for Africa’s High Corruption Perception 
 
Studies offer various explanations for the high levels of corruption perception in Africa despite 
increased measures to curtail it. According to Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell (2010), based on 
case studies in Kenya and Uganda, the high perception is the result of the mischaracterization 
of corruption in the African context. The principal-agent framework, according to the authors, 
underscores the recent anti-corruption reforms. They claim corruption in Africa, is more a 
collective action problem. As such, the costs of combating corruption in the short-run outweigh 
its gains. If fighting this crime rests on the principal-agent framework, in nations where corrupt 
practices seem to be the rule, even if many disapprove of it, but as leaders and bureaucrats tend 
to lack the political will to fight corruption aggressively, the authors contend the anti-corruption 
measures would mostly fail.   
Research by the United Nations Economic Council for Africa (UNCEA, 2016), contends the 
perception-based measures, the focus of most of the international anti-corruption organizations 
underreport the complexities on Corruption in Africa. Focusing on one’s attitude and not the 
nature or the magnitude of the corrupt acts may not be useful for policymaking in Africa. A 
victim of corruption may feel their country is very corrupt, while people who may not have 
experienced it might think differently. Sequeira (2012) argues that interviewees might be 
impacted by the recent views of corruption in a country, even if they have not experienced it 
themselves, in a manner foreign experts and businesspersons would expect developing nations 
to be corrupt.  With graft’s clandestine nature and the extent unscrupulous agents seek to hide 
their crimes, developing alternatives means to measure corruption in Africa seem to be 
challenging. The debate among scholars is either to measure corruption in Africa objectively 
(factual events), i.e., the sequence of corrupt events, anti-corruption laws adopted, court records 
on related charges and convictions and cases that get media attention. However, such objective 
reporting would depend on the capacities of a government and the media to report and combat 
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corruption. In instances officials tasked with fighting corruption tend to be part of the problem, 
objective reporting may be undermined. Johnston and Kpundeh (2002) state academics who 
argue for the use of accurate reporting tend to favor proxy indicators that check observable 
differences in government policies and the in the economy that makes easy for citizens to 
engage in corrupt acts or highlight the effects of corruption.  
Experts agree corruption in Africa is systemic and requires community engagement and 
democratization. “Measuring Corruption in African: The International Dimension Matters” 
(2016) highlights that adequately measuring corruption and understanding its international 
dimensions are essential to winning the fight against graft. The report contends that the 
famously used definition of corruption as an “abuse of power for private gains” understates the 
various dimension of the problem by putting too much emphasis on the public office while 
omitting important roles private agents play and the international nature of corruption in the 
African context. Corrupt practices in most countries extend to jurisdictions beyond borders, are 
not only the faults of corrupt African bureaucrats alone or private agents, both African 
businessmen, and multinational firms play roles in it. Illicit cash transfers across countries are 
the phenomenon that affects nations and unless such aspects of African corruption are 
highlighted, fighting this plaque will remain elusive.  
According to Shah and Schacter (2004), weak institutions can be essential determinants of 
corruption. As most nations on the continent tend to suffer from poor-regulatory and 
enforcement regimes which can trigger and enable corruption to grow; thus, African 
governments should seek to improve the institutional structures and engage citizens in decision 
making to improve governance.  
Chêne (2011) elaborates that increased transparency and citizen-participation, strengthening 
and enforcing anti-corruption principles and effective administration are required to control 
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corruption. Such enhanced clarity would require efforts to changing minds and attitudes 
towards public administration on the continent. While most nations now have anti-corruption 
institutions and various regulations, few or any are genuinely useful. Effective enforcement of 
laws remains a challenge and sometimes overshadowed by political considerations. Weak 
institutional structures and lack of strong political will to prosecute corrupt agents allow 
multinational firms to bribe their ways through systems. They sometimes bribe public officials 
to gain an unfair advantage to pay meager or no taxes, exploit the system and to secure the 
political edge in government policies. Such abuse of the system is rampant in most African 
countries which could end up costing nations more lost revenues than petty corruption by 
bureaucrats. 
Table 7 below, based on the data by Escresa and Picci, who developed a seminal World Bank 
paper in 2015 to construct a new cross-national corruption index, shows the geographic 
distribution of public officials that are involved in trans-border corruption. Model on similar 
metrics as cited in a UNECA 2016 publication on measuring corruption in Africa.   Table 7 
indicates cross-border corruption cases involving foreign firms in Africa.  95.5% or 1075 firms 
out of 1080 cross-border corruption cases on the continent between 1995-2014 involved non-
African firms.  It shows the external dimension of the high involvement of foreign actors in 
corrupt practices in Africa (“Measuring corruption in Africa: The international dimension 
matters,” 2016). Unfortunately, perception-based research rarely cites this aspect of corruption. 
To curtail graft in Africa, states and the international communities must cooperate to address 
this phenomenon. 
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Table 5: Number of cross border cases of corruption by foreign firms  
    
Years Total number of cases in Africa 
  From rest of the World Africa 
1995-1999 135 0 
2000-2004 383 3 
2005-2009 350 0 
2010-2014 207 2 
Total 1995-2014 1075 5 
Source: (Escresa & Picci, 2017) 
Note: This table shows the international dimension of corruption in Africa. It indicates the numbers of cases of 
transnational corruption by foreign firms and African companies from 1995-2014.  
  
4.3. Limitations of the Study 
While we are confident that our findings are robust to various specifications, considering the 
correlations between democracy, press freedom and corruption, we acknowledge including 
instrumental variable regressions could improve the impact of our results. Due to time 
constraint, the rush to meet graduation deadline and our inability to find suitable instruments, 
we could not continue with this approach.  
We also sought to prove the international dimension of corruption in Africa extensively, but 
with very few prior studies, data limitation and the need for field studies constrained our ability 
to do much analysis in this area. A lot of the research data on corruption rely on the perception-
based approach which hardly cover this aspect. Considering how measuring corruption can 
affect ways to combating it, we highlight the need for further studies to developing objective 
metrics on corruption to help Africa in her fight against graft. 
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Chapter 5 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
5.1. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we study the interaction effect of democracy and freedom of the press on 
corruption. Prior studies and the analysis of the data show it takes the combined effects of these 
variables to lower corruption in countries. The collective impacts work in the following 
channels: Citizens can oust corrupt officials through democratic elections, and a robust free 
press can share lights on illicit acts making it costly for crooked agents to engage in corruption 
thereby lowering the incidence of graft. Since the 1960s, Academics have been working to 
understand how corruption impacts development in countries (Rose-Ackerman, 1975). Rose-
Ackerman (1978) argues that more press freedom can limit the inequality of information in 
government. With useful information about governance and wrongdoings of public officials, 
citizen participation increases which could empower them to hold corrupt officials accountable 
at the polls in democratic countries. Using a 17-year panel data, we study this assumption and 
show that democratization and press freedom could have effects on controlling corruption. In 
the data, countries with low levels of corruption perception, i.e., New Zealand, Sweden, and 
Canada, etc. have good democracy and press freedom scores. Somalia, DRC Congo and North 
Korea with more corruption tend to have the worst democracy and freedom of the press 
indexes. Our sub-group analysis highlights, the two institutional variables (press freedom and 
democracy) are jointly significant in helping to lower corruption.  
While corruption in sub-Saharan countries is an African problem as it is having detrimental 
effects on growth and all aspects of citizens’ lives, further analyses of the phenomenon indicate 
it would require international solutions to help curb it. Africa’s vast mineral resources and weak 
governance make it a magnet for crooked state agents, predatory foreign firms, and off-shore 
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banks across the globe facilitating the rampant corruption on the continent. Our study shows 
the international dimension of corruption is significant, and efforts must be undertaken by 
member states and their global partners to help combat it to facilitate wins in the fight against 
graft.  
5.2.  Policy Recommendations  
Despite the challenges in fighting corruption, studies reveal that effective governance matters 
most. Democratization should go on with greater openness to allow citizens to have access to 
free and fair information. In nations where journalists can report freely without fear or 
intimidation, the masses can have access to uncensored information to make value judgments 
about politicians which in the long run can make it costly to engage in corrupt behaviors. If 
there is no press freedom and with government controls on access to public information, the 
so-called democratization may not lead to lowering corruption. But good reforms in abolishing 
restrictive media laws leading to more unbiased information about states’ politics and 
adherence to the rule of law can empower citizens to hold corrupt officeholders accountable at 
the polls. While these two determinants are equally important, studies have found democratic 
reforms in the former Soviet states and some countries in Africa that maintain restrictive media 
laws and abuses against journalists, have not made the needed gains against corruption.  
Nowadays, most African nations have various laws on graft and anti-corruption bodies, but as 
the rules are not adequately applied or the agencies lack prosecutorial powers, the abuse of 
power and illicit behaviors remain rampant which can have dire consequences on the rule of 
law. This research suggests transparent and effective democratic systems that help citizens to 
have unbiased and reliable information can help to increase voters’ interest in public 
administration and empower them to make smart decisions at the polls. A politician’s fear of 
being punished by the voters can help limit suspicious behaviors if the likelihood of a corrupt 
official losing their seats is high, thus, lowering corruption. 
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Mere voting, but not knowing much about the candidates’ backgrounds may not result in 
lowering corruption. Voters in Liberia zealously elected a new President, George Weah, in 
2017 and scores of senators and representatives. With limited voters’ knowledge of the elected 
officials, huge corruption scandals have engulfed the country in less than six months into the 
new administration. These cases highlight that voting alone does not ensure lowering 
corruption.  According to FrontPage (2018), the new banknotes the Central Bank of Liberia 
printed overseas that entered the country during the transitional period or few months into the 
new administration have been embezzled by public officials. These claims have resulted in a 
major political crisis and have made economic conditions worsen in the country. Unlike the 
past when citizens did not have much access to good information, with aggressive reporting by 
the Liberian media houses and increased social media activities by citizens, there is now more 
public scrutiny on the government to properly investigate the crimes. This increased social 
media use and robust reporting by Liberians journalists have increased pressure by the 
country’s donor partners and citizens to hold the culprits to account.   
 Illicit cross-border transfers reveal the international dimension of corruption in Africa. African 
governments and their international partners must collaborate to ensure there are no safe-
heavens for stolen states’ funds. Member states must work harder to make anti-corruption 
commissions effective and cement cooperation among regional and international jurisdictions 
to limit fraudulent cross border transfers. It is often the case on the continent that corrupt agents 
with associations to the higher-ups tend to have claims against them dropped, not adequately 
prosecuted, or walk away free with impunity. While anti-corruption bodies are numerous on 
the continent, their politicization and weak enforcement of the findings seem to render them 
useless.  If African nations are to make a significant impact on reducing corruption, all citizens 
must fairly be subjected to the rule of law. 
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